The conversation around Sabah’s autonomy has taken on a new urgency, with political leaders pushing for the state to follow Sarawak’s lead in reclaiming control over its resources, economy, and governance.
But while the calls for action are getting louder, the real question is whether Sabah has already fallen too far behind.
Sarawak has been playing the long game. Over the past decade, it has systematically negotiated its way to greater autonomy, securing a five percent sales tax on petroleum products, establishing its own state-owned oil and gas company, and gaining regulatory control over key industries.
The result? Billions in additional revenue and a firm grip on its economic future.
Sabah, on the other hand, has struggled to match that pace. It introduced its own sales tax on petroleum in 2020 under the Warisan government, but the results haven’t been as transformative.
While Sarawak forced Petronas to acknowledge its authority over gas supply and created its own aggregator in Petros, Sabah is still negotiating its role in the industry.
SMJ Energy, its state-owned oil and gas entity, exists—but without the same level of independence Sarawak has secured.
The power sector tells a similar story. Sarawak has long dictated its own energy policies, funding large-scale hydropower projects and managing its own supply.
Sabah only began asserting control recently, taking over onshore gas supply regulation in January 2023 and securing authority over electricity and renewable energy a year later.
While the moves are significant, they come years after Sarawak laid the groundwork for full control.
And then there’s the Petros-Petronas standoff. In February 2024, Sarawak doubled down on its claim over gas distribution by appointing Petros as the state’s sole gas aggregator.
Petronas pushed back, but after months of negotiations, a settlement in January 2025 saw Sarawak formally take charge—except for liquefied natural gas (LNG), which remains under Petronas.
It was a calculated power move, one that solidified Sarawak’s dominance over its energy sector.
Sabah, meanwhile, hasn’t made the same bold plays. It has the legal framework under MA63 to demand more, but leadership changes, party-hopping, and federal influence have kept its autonomy efforts in limbo.
Unlike Sarawak’s ruling coalition, Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), which operates as a unified political force, Sabah’s fragmented landscape has made negotiations with Putrajaya inconsistent and largely ineffective.
Even in areas like immigration, the differences are obvious. Sarawak enforces strict entry rules, requiring work permits for non-Sarawakians.
Sabah technically has the same authority but applies it with far less rigidity, allowing greater federal oversight.
Not everyone is convinced that following Sarawak’s lead is the right move. Sabah UMNO chief Datuk Seri Bung Moktar Radin dismissed the idea that simply mimicking Sarawak will restore autonomy, calling out symbolic gestures like renaming the Chief Minister’s position to “Premier” as performative at best.
“Changing the title alone does not mean we will get back our rights. We need real action, not just following Sarawak without a clear strategy,” he said.
And that’s exactly where the problem lies. The blueprint is there. The legal basis is there.
The precedent has been set. But Sabah remains in a holding pattern, unable—or unwilling—to push forward with the same intensity as Sarawak.
The frustration is mounting.
Federal funding constraints, slow economic development, and unfulfilled promises under MA63 have left many wondering if Sabah’s leadership has the political will to act—or if they’ve already missed their moment. — February 11, 2025.
